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Policy Space for Capital Controls and
Macroeconomic Stability: Lessons from Emerging
Economies
Christiana E. E. Okojie*
I.

F

Introduction

oreign capital flows consist of movement of financial resources from one
country to another. Capital inflows can help a developing country to fill
resources gap where savings are inadequate to finance investment. Since
the 1990s, there has been an increase in the volume of private capital flows to
and from emerging market economies. This has been due to increasing financial
openness and strong growth prospects and positive interest differentials in these
economies (Mohan and Kapur, 2010). However, most sub-Saharan African
countries which critically need foreign exchange have been relatively
marginalised by foreign investors. While capital flows provide liquidity to recipient
countries, they make monetary and exchange rate policy more challenging.
Capital flows affect a wide variety of macroeconomic variables such as
exchange rates, interest rates, external reserves, domestic savings and investment
(Sumanjeet, 2009). In a world of increasingly integrated financial markets and
high financial mobility, the volatility of capital flows and sudden loss of
confidence have often resulted in severe financial crises with significant domestic
and international effects.
Furthermore, capital inflows can involve the loss of local control over economic
decision-making, for example, with respect to majority-owned foreign direct
investment. A decline in capital inflows can slowdown growth rate or lead to loss
of foreign reserves. Sustainable growth, low inflation, steady growth of
employment, low levels of unemployment and a balanced public finance are
usually regarded as the main indicators of macroeconomic stability. However,
since the 2008-09 global financial crisis, the importance of the financial sector has
been recognised. It is now realised that there is need to maintain financial and
macroeconomic stability concurrently and these remain major policy challenges.
How do capital controls contribute to achieving macroeconomic and financial
stability?
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The 1990s witnessed a number of capital account crises in emerging market
economies (EMEs). The crises which were a result of sudden reversals of capital
inflows, occurred against the background of financial market deregulation,
capital account liberalisation, and financial sector opening. While deregulation
and liberalisation yielded benefits such as increased financial resource
mobilisation for domestic investment and economic growth, it created new
sources of macroeconomic vulnerabilities. The high frequency of crises in
emerging economies (East Asia, Russia, Latin Americas) led policymakers in these
countries to question the virtue of unrestricted capital mobility in an increasingly
globalising and potentially volatile world economy. Therefore, large swings in
foreign capital flows and their potential volatility necessitated measures to
manage capital flows by emerging and developing countries.
Furthermore, as countries recovered from the recent global financial crisis, capital
began to flow in and out of emerging market economies. Despite the benefits of
capital flows, many EMEs are now concerned that the new surge in capital
inflows, many of which are deemed transient, can cause problems for their
economies. Their concern is that these massive capital inflows can lead to strong
appreciations of their exchange rates and complicate economic management;
inflate asset price bubbles which can amplify financial fragility and crisis risk (Ostry
et al.., 2011). After the crisis, policymakers are reconsidering the idea that
unfettered capital flows are a fundamentally benign phenomenon and that all
financial flows are a result of rational agents‟ decisions. There is increasing
concern that foreign investors are subject to herd behaviour and suffer from
excessive optimism and that capital flows can contribute to damage such as
assets bubbles. Such concerns have led to renewed interest in capital controls
(Ostry et al.., 2011). With low interest rates likely to persist for some time in the
advanced countries, emerging market economies are likely to attract capital
inflows for some years; the rapid appreciation of interest rates has generated
concern for potential “currency wars”.
Many of the EMEs have accumulated increasing foreign reserves with the result
that the external financial constraint of the1990s is no longer an issue for them.
Large capital inflows emerged as a problem in the years 2003-2007 for major EMEs
and created new challenges for macroeconomic management and financial
stability. Since the 1980s, about 15 per cent of episodes of large capital inflows
have ended in crisis (Mohan and Kapur, 2010). Thus, to protect their economies
from undue volatility, some EMEs have responded and adopted various measures
to manage their capital accounts. Issues of interest in this paper include a review
of the policy options for managing capital flows. What is the place and
relevance of capital controls for addressing macroeconomic stability concerns in
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an environment of increasing capital inflows? What policy space is available for
adoption of capital controls in an environment of global financial market
volatility? Does implementation of capital controls create policy space for
independent monetary policy to address macroeconomic instability concerns?
How have emerging market economies addressed the challenges?
Section two of the paper discusses the concept of policy space and the factors
influencing policy space in developing economies. Section three addresses
policy options for managing capital flows with focus on capital controls, it also
discusses changing attitudes towards capital controls by researchers and
agencies with emphasis on the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Section four
discusses the experiences of a few emerging economies, their use of capital
controls, with assessments of the impacts and effectiveness of capital controls,
and raises lessons for other developing counties. Section five concludes the
paper.

II.

Conceptualising Policy Space

II.1

Financial Integration and Policy Space

A stable macroeconomic environment is regarded as being conducive to longterm growth. However, there is disagreement over whether price stability should
be a central objective of macroeconomic policies or whether these policies
should target broader development goals (Ocampo and Vos, 2008). Until the
1970s, macroeconomic policies in developing countries were mainly growthoriented national development strategies. However, severe macroeconomic
instability faced by many developing countries since the 1980s has narrowed the
focus of macroeconomic policies to lowering inflation and the avoidance of
major fiscal and external imbalances. Although many developing countries were
able to reduce inflation and restore fiscal balance by applying such policies,
many did not achieve sustained economic growth. This has called for a return to
a broad developmental approach by macroeconomic policies. Proponents of
this view argue that macroeconomic policies should be growth-centred with full
employment as the ultimate objective (Ocampo and Vos, 2008). It is also argued
that because of differences in development levels, quality of institutions, and
degree of vulnerability to global macroeconomic and financial instability, the
policy framework for developing countries should differ from that in advanced
countries. Thus, a critical question is how much “policy space” do developing
countries have to adopt autonomous and effective counter-cyclical
macroeconomic policies which are consistent with their long-term development
objectives? Many policy analysts are of the view that with increasing integration
of global markets, developing countries have lost such policy space (Ocampo
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and Vos, 2008). Small developing countries are often seen as “rule-takers” in the
global economy (Molina, 2013). They have little influence in formulating the rules
of international cooperation and often have little bargaining power within these
rules, although some authors believe that despite these power imbalances,
developing countries can find room to manoeuvre within global governance
rules (Molina, 2013). What is “policy space” and why the concern with policy
space?

II.2

What is Policy Space?

A number of authors have defined the concept of “policy space”. In Molina
(2013, policy space is defined as “the degree of autonomy that states have to
shape their development ends and means. This includes both de jure policy
space (describing the language of multilateral agreements and treaties), and de
facto policy space (as evidenced by room to maneuver within or outside existing
rules). He added that not all multilateral policy rules affect a country‟s policy
space.
According to Martinez-Diaz (2006), the concept of “policy space” is most often
used in debates about how certain rules in the global economy, especially those
emanating from the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and its subsidiary
agreements, constrain countries‟ policy options for medium and long-term
economic development. It refers to the need for poor countries to have enough
space to craft their own economic policy and adequate room for policy
autonomy and experimentation. Similarly, it could connote the freedom of
developing countries to pursue among other things, the kinds of development
policies used in the past by what today are the world‟s advanced economies.
Koivusalo, et al. (2009) defined policy space as the “freedom, scope and
mechanisms that governments have to choose, design and implement public
policies to fulfil their aims”. Their concern was with how globalisation and the
processes that comprise it are influencing the availability of such space. They
added that concerns with policy space have been raised mainly in the context
of economic, trade and development policies.
Although it did not define the concept of “policy space”, the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development also discussed the idea of policy space
in its 2004 and 2008 Conferences. In its 2004 Conference, the Sao Paulo
Consensus Document recognised that:
The increasing interdependence of national
economies in a globalising world and the
emergence
of
rule-based
regimes
for
international economic relations have meant
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that the space for national economic policy,
i.e., the scope for domestic policies, especially
in the areas of trade, investment and industrial
development, is now often framed by
international disciplines, commitments and
global market considerations. It is for each
Government to evaluate the trade-off between
the benefits of accepting international rules and
commitments and the constraints posed by the
loss of policy space. It is particularly important
for developing countries, bearing in mind
development goals and objectives, that all
countries take into account the need for
appropriate balance between national policy
space and international disciplines and
commitments.
The 2006 UNCTAD Report states that:
There are widespread concerns that the
international trade rules and regulations, which
are
emerging
from
multilateral
trade
negotiations and a rising number of regional
and bilateral trade arrangements, could rule
out the very policy measures that were
instrumental in the development of today’s
mature economies and late industrialisers. This
would imply a considerable reduction in the
flexibility of national governments to pursue their
development objectives. Another concern is
that these rules and commitments, which in
legal terms are equally binding for all countries,
in economic terms might impose more binding
constraints on developing than on developed
countries, because of differences in their
respective structural features and levels of
industrial development.
The current debate on the role of national policies in economic development
concerns the concept of “policy space”, and focuses on the tension between
international economic integration and the autonomy available to nation states
to pursue policies that effectively support their development. He emphasised

Central Bank of Nigeria Economic and Financial Review

Volume 51/4 December 2013

150

that much of the debate on “policy space” is confined to trade policy and
revolves around the Uruguay Round Agreements, especially as the UR
agreements restrict sovereignty of nation states to make their own policy
decisions. Thus international economic integration affects national policy space
by reducing policy options available to policy makers. International economic
integration weakens de facto control over national economic development by
allowing foreign actions to influence national macroeconomic targets.
Furthermore, multilateral rules and commitments reduce de jure policy control
over policy instruments.

II.3

Constraints/Limits on National Policy Space

Constraints on national policy space arise from inequalities in resources and
bargaining power between developing and industrialised countries. Major factors
limiting policy space are:





The multilaterally negotiated rules and obligations in trade and finance as
embodied in various agreements in the World Trade Organisation,
The Structural conditionality attached to lending by the Bretton Woods
Institutions (BWIs) which constitutes the second most important source of
multilateral constraints over development policy (Akyuz, 2007).
In addition, for countries dependent on official financing, the policy
space is also eroded by conditions attached to loans and grants by
multilateral financial institutions and bilateral donors (Akyuz, 2007).
Commitments made by developing countries in bilateral or regional
agreements with major industrial countries not only extend WTO
disciplines in industrial tariffs, services and intellectual property rights, they
also add new obligations in areas left out of multilateral legislation such
as capital account regimes, foreign direct investment and enforceable
environment or labour standards (Akyuz, 2007). Hundreds of regional
trade agreements (RTAs) and bilateral investment agreements are
presently in place. Bilateral and regional agreements often try to
incorporate intellectual property rights that go beyond those in WTO
agreements (Koivusalo, et al., 2009).

Akyuz (2007) pointed out that in a world where national economies are closely
integrated, multilateral rules and obligations are needed to contain negative
externalities such as financial contagion and environmental degradation. They
are also needed to prevent discriminatory and beggar-my-neighbour policies.
While multilateralism is valuable to smaller and weaker countries, an appropriate
balance should be struck between national policy space and international
disciplines and commitments.
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However, reviewing the WTO in particular, Akyuz (2007) observed that some trade
agreements, for example, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
contain statements that recognise the rights of governments to make regulations
aimed at achieving set objectives. He noted that although many of the policy
instruments used by today‟s industrialised countries are no longer available to
developing countries because of multilateral rules and obligations such as the
WTO, these multilateral rules and practices permit wider policy space than is
usually assumed, for example:






Many areas of policy remain outside the multilateral disciplines, for
example, no rules force a country to adopt a particular exchange rate or
capital account regime. There are also no strict rules in areas such as
foreign direct investment, trade in services and competition policy.
Existing constraints in these areas are a result of loan conditionality by the
Bretton Woods institutions as well as bilateral or regional agreements and
multilateral commitments.
Except for countries depending on official assistance, many constraints
arise from deliberate policy choices or from domestic policy failures to
resolve deep-seated structural problems.
There is policy diversity among developing countries because of
differences in willingness to fully adopt financial integration or to exploit
the policy space allowed by existing multilateral rules and practices.

Contributing to the discussion on constraints to public space, Griffith-Jones and
Stallings (1995) described the constraints on policy space created by financial
markets as “implicit conditionality” as contrasted with “explicit conditionality”
attached to loans from multilateral financial institutions. Such constraints are
effective because countries are unwilling to incur penalties attached to noncompliance or risk while implementing policies they feel will be viewed negatively
by sources of external finance.
Also of interest is the capacity to use available policy space effectively by better
articulation of their domestic priorities within existing multilateral rules and
commitments. To what extent is available policy space effectively utilised by
policy makers? Furthermore, while the possibility of exit from multilateral
agreements has been considered by some developing countries, such options
are rarely exercised because of their relative weaknesses in bilateral relations with
major economic and political powers (Aykuz, 2007).
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III.

Capital Controls For Macroeconomic Stability

III.1

Background - Financial Integration and Capital Account Management

At the 2013 annual IMF conference with the theme “Rethinking Macro Policy II:
First Steps and Early Lessons”, De Gregorio (2013) in his presentation stated that
international financial integration and capital account management have
become central issues in policy discussions in recent years, although the issues are
not new in emerging market economies. He added that some had disastrous
experiences with financial crises which were often caused by poor management
of financial integration and weak macroeconomic policies. Since the 1970s, the
Bretton Woods Institutions had advocated the benefits of financial integration, the liberalisation of capital flows across all borders. While some countries have
gained significantly from capital inflows, several have encountered financial
crises. This experience had encouraged the adoption of capital controls by some
emerging and developing countries. Until recently, some economists, financial
institutions and industrialised countries have been hostile to regulating capital
movements. However, the IMF has now recognised that capital flows can be
destabilizing – causing currency appreciation, asset bubbles, and volatility in
developing countries (Gallagher, 2011). This change in attitude has been
reflected in its recent annual meetings.

III.2

Capital Controls - Concepts and Debate

III.2.1 Concepts – Definitions, Types, and Objectives of Capital Controls
Ostry et al. (2010, 2011) discuss various macroeconomic policy measures for
addressing surges in capital inflows, they include exchange rate appreciation,
reserve accumulation, sterilisation, fiscal and monetary policy changes, and
capital controls. Capital controls are now recognised as part of the policy toolkit
for financial stability. According to Ostry et al. (2010, 2011), capital controls “limit
the rights of residents or non-residents to enter into capital transactions or to
effect the transfers and payments associated with these transactions”. They are,
however, of the view that capital controls, because of their discriminatory nature,
should only be used after other macroeconomic tools have been adjusted in
response to the capital inflow surge.
Capital controls have been highly stigmatised and the IMF proposed a new
nomenclature for capital controls, suggesting that they should be called “capital
flow management measures” (Gallagher, 2011). Some others have also
suggested the term “capital management techniques” (Ocampo, et al., 2008).
“Capital management techniques” is a term used to describe a combination of
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capital and exchange controls plus financial prudential regulations that indirectly
affect these flows and their impacts (Epstein, 2009). Gallagher et al. (2011)
referred to them as “capital account regulations” to underscore the fact that
they belong to the broader family of financial regulations. What are capital
controls?
Definitions of capital controls: Some authors define capital controls as
“regulations on capital flows” (Gallagher et al., 2011). Capital controls are
residency-based measures which limit the rights of residents or non-residents to
enter into capital transactions or to effect transfers and payments associated
with these transactions (Ostry, et al., 2011). They are limits on the level or
composition of foreign private capital that can enter or leave a nation
(Gallagher, 2011). Capital controls can be economy-wide, sector–specific, or
industry-specific. Gallagher et al. (2011) emphasised that capital controls
(capital account regulations) should be seen as an essential part of
macroeconomic policy toolkit and not as a mere measure of last resort, they are
part of policy options used to manage the capital account.
Types, Objectives and benefits of capital controls: Capital controls are often used
to manage exchange rate volatility, avoid maturity mismatches, limit speculative
activity in an economy, and provide the policy space for independent monetary
policy (Gallagher, 2011).
In Engel (2011) four potential objectives of capital controls are identified as:
 Reduce the volume of capital flows,
 Alter the composition of capital flows towards longer maturities,
 Reduce real exchange rate pressures, and
 Allow for a more independent monetary policy.
Capital controls can target inflows or outflows of capital, they can be price or
quantity based, direct or indirect. Petkovski and Georgieva (2012), also
distinguished between permanent and temporary capital controls. Permanent
controls are usually part of long-term development strategies while temporary
measures are usually introduced in exceptional situations, for example, in
situations of large inflows of “hot money”.
Price versus quantitative measures: Some controls work through price measures,
for example, taxes on inflows or outflows. Other controls work through
quantitative channels, for example, restrictions or caps on sales or purchase of
assets, bans on sales of assets, limits on buying equity in some industries or shares
in domestic firms, etc.
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Direct versus indirect controls: We can also distinguish between regulations that
impact directly on capital flows from those that impact indirectly. Direct
measures aim at directly affecting the volume of cross-border financial
transactions through outright prohibitions, quantitative limits, or government
approval procedures. Indirect measures try to make cross border flows more
costly, for example through reserve requirements (Anderson, 2009).
Arguments for capital controls: Arguments in favour of capital controls include
the following:
 Capital controls can represent an optimal macro-prudential policy that
reduces the risk of financial crises.
 Global economic growth was on average higher during the Bretton
Woods period when capital controls were widely used.
 Capital controls which limit residents from owning foreign assets can
ensure that domestic credit is available more cheaply than would
otherwise be the case.
 Economic crises have been more frequent since the Bretton Woods
capital controls were relaxed.
Disadvantages of capital controls: Petkovski and Georgieva (2012) identified
some disadvantages of capital controls as:
 Capital controls limit free flows of capital and deny depositors from
earning the best possible returns and firms from borrowing under the most
favourable conditions. As a result, both savings and investment suffer with
negative impacts on growth and long-term development.
 In emerging markets, outward capital controls are not very efficient
during periods of crises as they can be evaded.
 Capital controls encourage corruption by government officials who allow
domestic residents to take money out of the country for a kick-back.
 Sometimes, capital controls are used as substitute for other appropriate
domestic policies for managing the financial system or financial crises.
Studies show that large uncontrolled capital inflows have often destabilised
development in some countries by: causing appreciation of the domestic
currency, contributed to rising inflation, and causing unsustainable economic
booms which often precede financial crisis, that is, when there is a reversal of
foreign inflows and capital flight out of the country.
Considerations in adopting capital controls
In the IMF Position Paper on capital controls, Ostry et al. (2010) highlighted some
factors which should be considered in adopting capital controls, they are:
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Effectiveness: How effective will the capital control measures be? They
are likely to be effective where the administrative apparatus to implement
them is already in place. It will be easier to implement where countries
have a substantially closed capital account, although such countries
have less need of further capital controls.
Controls on outflows: Although focus tends to be on inflows, controls on
outflows can also have an impact on aggregate net inflows. For
example, assurances that capital can be repatriated can make the
country an attractive destination for investors.
Multilateral considerations: Decisions to adopt capital controls need to
take account of their multilateral implications. The concern is that
widespread use of capital controls by emerging economies can have
negative impacts on efficient allocation of investment across countries.
Adoption by one country may lead others to follow in what is identified as
a “beggar-my-neighbour” policy.

Overall, according to Ostry et al. (2010), during large capital inflows that can fuel
credit booms, macroeconomic policies and prudential regulations can be
complemented by appropriately designed capital controls, especially during
temporary inflow surges.

III.3

Restrictions on Use of Capital Controls

As mentioned already, the major restrictions on capital controls are the various
international, bilateral and other agreements which restrict the use of capital
controls. These international arrangements erode the policy space provided for
under the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. (see appendix 3 for details).

III.4

Evolution of Attitudes towards Capital Controls

Until recently, the Bretton Woods institutions were hostile to the use of capital
controls. This was in spite of the fact that the Articles of Agreement establishing
the IMF permitted the use of capital controls by member countries. Thus, Article
VI, Section 3 of the IMF Articles of Agreement permitted the use of capital
controls by member countries, it states that (IMF, 2011):
Members may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international
capital movements, but no member country may exercise those controls in a
manner which will restrict payment for current transactions, or which will unduly
delay transfer of funds in settlement of commitments, except as provided in
Article VII, Section 3(b) and Article XIV, Section 2.
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The negotiations for the establishment of the IMF after World War II and the Great
Depression were influenced by British economist John Maynard Keynes who
stated that “control of capital movements, both inward and outward, should be
a permanent feature of the postwar system”.
Before World War I, the
industrialised economies of Europe and the United States were characterised by
a high degree of global financial integration, with a large role for markets
(Epstein, 2009). Many counties‟ financial systems were based on the gold
standard. This system of free capital mobility collapsed, along with many
economies, during the Great Depression. Studies showed that a major contributor
to the collapse was the approach to markets which resulted in the accumulation
of debts and highly speculative investments, many of which failed. International
capital flows also contributed to worsening the crisis (Epstein, 2009). Thus, in
creating the IMF after the Second World War, governments were allowed to
adopt capital controls as advocated by John Maynard Keynes.
Over time, however, there was a relaxation of these financial controls and a
return to global financial integration with free capital mobility. This era was
marked by the frequency and severity of banking and financial crises which
affected emerging and developing countries primarily such as the Asian financial
crisis in 1997-98. This was followed by the Russian crisis in 1998. The Asian crisis
affected many emerging economies such as Thailand, South Korea and
Malaysia. In spite of this, the IMF continued to support and advocate financial
liberalisation and the elimination of capital controls. During the Asian financial
crisis, countries which imposed capital controls, such as China and India, were
less negatively affected than countries which did not impose or had few capital
controls (Epstein, 2009; Gallagher, 2011). In the 1990s, credit rating agencies
would downgrade the credit ratings of nations that imposed capital controls, the
concept of “capital controls” was stigmatised (Gallagher, 2011). In the 1990s, the
IMF tried to amend the Article of Agreement to require nations to fully liberalise
their capital accounts and only allowing capital controls as temporary
safeguards under extreme circumstances (Gallagher, 2011). However, the recent
Global Financial Crisis brought a change of attitude by the IMF towards the use of
“capital controls”. First in 2011 and again in 2013, the IMF held its annual
conferences with the theme “Rethinking Macroeconomics” where it was
highlighted that the global financial crisis had shattered many of their
preconceived views on macroeconomic policies.
At the 2013 IMF Conference, Subbarao (2013) in his presentation on capital
account management noted that the change in capital account management
is one of the most remarkable intellectual shifts arising from the 2008 Global
Financial Crisis. He identified three big issues on which pre-crisis consensus had
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dissolved, they are: movement towards a fully open capital account, the use of
capital controls as a short-run stabilisation tool, and the desirability of foreign
exchange intervention.
o

o

o

Movement towards a fully open capital account: Before the crisis, the
consensus was that all countries should move towards a fully open capital
account, this consensus is now broken. Thus, although there is consensus
that free trade in goods enhances welfare, opinion is now divided on the
virtues of financial openness.
Capital controls as a stabilisation tool: Before the crisis, consensus was that
capital controls are not a desirable policy tool. The debate was on
effectiveness of capital controls and whether price or quantity controls
should be used.
Foreign exchange interventions: The pre-crisis consensus at least among
the advanced countries, was that intervention in the foreign exchange
market is suboptimal. The consensus no longer holds.

In what has been described as the “end of an era in finance” by some
economists (Rodrik, 2010; Gallagher, 2010), the about-face by the IMF was
discussed. In 2010 the IMF published a staff position note which showed that
capital controls not only work, they were also associated with avoiding some of
the worst growth outcomes of the current financial crises (Gallagher, 2010). The
paper concluded that the “use of capital controls – in addition to both prudential
and macroeconomic policy – is justified as part of the policy toolkit”. One
justification for imposing capital controls is to prevent massive inflows of “hot
money” that can appreciate the exchange rate, undermine competitiveness
and threaten macroeconomic stability (Gallagher, 2010; Rodrik, 2010).
The position paper noted that: “if the economy is operating near potential, if the
level of reserves is adequate, if the exchange rate is not undervalued, and if the
flows are likely to be transitory, the use of capital controls is justified as one
element of the policy toolkit to manage inflows” (Ostry et al., 2010). Various
studies conducted while preparing the position note showed that capital controls
on inflows can make monetary policy more independent, alter the composition
of capital flows and reduce real exchange rate pressures (Gallagher, 2011). The
IMF (2011) in discussing policy tools for addressing capital inflow surges concluded
that:
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Capital controls can be useful in addressing both macroeconomic and
financial stability concerns in the face of inflow surges.
Regardless of the purpose of capital controls, countries should first exhaust
their macro policy options before implementing capital controls (or
prudential measures that act as capital controls).
Prudential regulations and capital controls can help to reduce distortions
as well as create distortions, for example, by reducing good as well as
bad financial flows.
Capital control measures should target the specific risks at hand. A
combination of prudential regulations and capital controls may be
appropriate.
There is no one-size-fits- all in designing capital controls, capital controls
should be country- specific if they are to be efficient and effective.

The IMF (2011) suggests that capital controls should be: used as a last resort and
as a temporary measure, only after a nation has accumulated sufficient reserves,
adjusted her interest rates, and allowed the currency to appreciate. It also
suggested that such controls should preferably be price-based, although
quantity-based controls should be used in the face of uncertainty where pricebased controls may be inappropriate (Gallagher, 2011). It has been pointed out
that more important than setting out guidelines, the IMF should focus on helping
nations to enforce such controls when they deem them appropriate (Gallagher,
2011). However, without the advice of the IMF, many emerging market
economies have implemented capital controls as will be discussed in the next
section.

IV.

Policy Space for Capital Controls – Experience of Emerging
Economies

IV.1

What are Emerging Economies?

In the 1970s, the term “less developed countries” (LDCs) was used to refer to
markets that were less developed than the “developed” countries such as the
United States, Japan, and countries in Western European, etc. The term
“emerging markets” was coined in reference to countries undergoing rapid
economic growth and industrialisation. Some authors use the term
interchangeably with “emerging and developing countries”, while some use it to
replace the term “emerging economies”. Several other definitions have been
provided. For example, some reason that “Emerging market country is a society
transitioning from a dictatorship to a free market-oriented economy, with
increasing economic freedom, gradual integration with the global marketplace
and with other members of the Global Emerging Market (GEM), an expanding
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middle class, improving standards of living, social stability and tolerance, as well
as an increase in cooperation with multilateral institutions”.
Emerging economies are sometimes deemed to have the following
characteristics:






IV.2

Intermediate income: Its PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) per capita income
lies between 10 per cent and 75 per cent of the average EU per capita
income,
Catching-up growth: During at least the last decade, it has experienced a
brisk
economic growth that has narrowed the income gap with
advanced countries, and
Institutional transformation and economic opening: During the same
period, it has undertaken profound institutional transformation which has
facilitated its integration more deeply into the world economy. Thus,
emerging economies appear to be a by-product of the current
industrialisation.

Policy Space
Experience

for

Capital

Controls

–

Emerging

Economies’

Over the years, in spite of hostility by international financial institutions, many
emerging economies have used various capital management techniques
targeted at both capital inflows and outflows, especially in the wake of various
financial crises they have experienced. Generally, in the aftermath of the Asian
crisis, there has been increased support of controls on capital inflows to prevent
future crises. Following the 1990s currency crisis, “the single most important factor
leading to the troubles that several of the East Asian countries encountered in the
late 1990s – the East Asian crisis – was the rapid liberalisation of financial and
capital markets” (Anderson, 2009). Controls on inflows can protect emerging
economies from international speculation and allow them to undertake an
independent monetary policy (Edwards, 1999). A few country case studies are
discussed here, they are: Chile, Malaysia, Colombia, Brazil and Thailand. Some
others have been discussed in the literature; they include China, India, Croatia,
and South Korea.

IV.2.1 Case Study: Malaysia
There were surges in capital inflows into Malaysia in the late 1980s reflecting
Malaysia‟s increasing attractiveness as a manufacturing centre in Asia. These
surges posed several challenges: risk of the economy overheating, loss of
monetary policy independence, appreciation of the ringgit, growth of bubbles in
the asset market, and financial sector instability (Cordero and Montecino, 2010).
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A number of policy tools have been utilised over the years to regain control over
monetary policy and slow down capital inflows.
In the early phase, Malaysia used capital controls targeted at capital inflows.
Since Malaysia started off with a low inflation rate, it was in a better position to
discourage short-term inflows by loosening monetary policy and lowering the
interest rate that was attracting the capital inflows. The measures adopted
succeeded in reversing the volume of short-term flows. Malaysia‟s controls on
inflows were designed to be short-term measures and were removed as soon as
the objectives were achieved.
After the Asian financial crisis, by 1998, the Malaysian authorities were concerned
with the adverse impacts of high interest rates on economic recovery. They
adopted measures which would enable stabilisation of the exchange rate and
reduction of interest rates to aid economic recovery. Thus, the controls adopted
targeted capital outflows and were aimed at: facilitating economic expansion,
defending the foreign exchange rate, reducing capital flight and preventing
further drain on foreign reserves (Cordero and Montecino, 2010).
Overall, the controls were able to reduce the volatility of the interest rate and
foreign exchange rates. The controls insulated Malaysia from some of the
prevailing external shocks at the time and provided more policy space to pursue
economic recovery (Cordero and Montecino, 2010). Furthermore the Malaysian
experience with capital controls showed that controls on outflows can help to
stabilise an economy during a crisis. In assessing the benefits of these controls to
Malaysia during the Asian crisis, authors have concluded that the controls
appeared to have helped Malaysia to avoid turning to the IMF as other Asian
countries did, namely, South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. At
that time, the IMF was imposing all kinds of conditionality which some countries
saw as intrusive and bad for their economic development. The implementation of
capital controls enabled Malaysia to avoid making unwanted commitments to
the IMF (Cordero and Montecino, 2010). It provided policy space for Malaysia to
adopt independent policies to address national development objectives.

IV.2.2 Case Study – Colombia
1993-1998: During the 1990s, Colombia implemented various structural reforms –
trade liberalisation, privatisation of public enterprises, etc. These reforms in
addition to low interest rates in the developed countries encouraged capital
inflows into Colombia. The surge in capital inflows put upward pressure on the
exchange rate and raised concerns about export competitiveness. Initially,
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sterilisation interventions were attempted, but these were insufficient to avoid
currency appreciation. Starting in 1993, Colombia implemented the URR –
unremunerated reserve requirements. This was applied to any foreign exchange
credit with a maturity below 18 months. It was later extended to cover some
trade credits (Ostry et al., 2010). Majority of the reviewers of the Colombian use of
the URR conclude that the URR was effective only in increasing the
independence of monetary authorities.
2007-08: During this period, Colombia again implemented the URR at the rate of
40 per cent on foreign borrowing and portfolio inflows. Limits were also imposed
on the currency derivative positions of banks (500 per cent of capital). Reviews
show that these were insufficient to reduce the volume of inflows, but were able
to alter the composition of inflows (Ostry et al., 2010).

IV.2.3 Case Study – Chile
Chile‟s experience of capital controls has attracted attention from economists,
policy advisers, it has been argued that Chile‟s use of capital controls has helped
the country to achieve a remarkable record of growth and stability by
discouraging short-term capital flows while attracting longer-term funds (Edwards,
1999).
Chile implemented controls on capital inflows in 1978-82 and 1991-98. Controls
were first imposed in 1978 as a result of massive capital inflows leading to
exchange rate appreciation. This phase ended when as a result of the Latin
American debt crisis, capital began to move out of the country. Controls were
reintroduced in June 1991 when there was a new surge in capital inflows partly
due to reduction in the country risk premium at the end of Pinochet dictatorship.
According to Edwards (1999), Ostry et al., (2010), and Cordero and Montecino
(2010), the main capital control measures adopted during these two periods
were:






Prohibition of inflows with maturities below 24 months.
URR for inflows with maturities between 24 to 66 months ranging from 10 to
25 per cent of the value of the inflows.
FDI was regulated throughout the period. In 1990, minimum stay
requirements and profits repatriation rates for FDI. In 1990, minimum stay
requirement was set at three years, but was lowered to one year in 1992.
Repatriation restrictions were eliminated in 1992.
In 1991, URR rate of 20 per cent applied only to foreign loans and fixed
income securities. The credits were to remain at the Chilean Central Bank
for up to one year without remuneration.
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In 1992, the URR rate was raised to 30 per cent and was extended to trade
credits and loans related to FDI.
In 1995, the URR was extended to apply to bonds, Chilean stock traded in
the New York Stock Exchange.
In June 1998, to reduce the risk that capital flows to Chile would decline
as part of contagion from the East Asian financial crisis, the URR rate was
reduced to 10 per cent and reduced to zero in September.

Review of Chile‟s experience with capital controls suggests that controls on
capital inflows were able to influence domestic interest rates. Controls on inflows
enabled Chile to undertake a more independent monetary policy. However,
rising domestic interest rates increased the cost of capital for domestic firms.

IV.2.4 Case Study – Thailand
Thailand has also implemented capital controls in the Asian financial crisis period
as well as in the global crisis era (Ostry et al., 2010).
1995-96: Measures implemented include:
 Imposition of URR on banks‟ nonresident baht accounts.
 Introduction of asymmetric open-position limits to discourage foreign
borrowing.

Imposition of reporting requirements for banks on risk-control measures in
foreign exchange and derivatives trading.
2006-08: The following measures were implemented:
 Imposition of URR of 30 per cent on foreign currencies sold or exchanged
against baht with authorised financial institutions (except for FDI and
amounts not exceeding US$20,000).
 Equity investments in companies listed on the stock exchange were
exempted from the URR.
Ostry et al., (2010) showed that the controls were effective in reducing inflows
and changing their composition as well as reducing pressures on the real
exchange rate..

IV.2.5 Case Study – Brazil
1993 – 1997: At the beginning of the 1990s, Brazil faced persistently high inflation
and a large fiscal deficit. During the 1990s, Brazil regained access to international
credit markets from which she was cut off during the debt crisis of the 1980s. There
was a large surge of capital inflows desiring to take advantage of the interest
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rate differential (between domestic and international rates). From 1992, the real
effective exchange rate appreciated markedly while the composition of capital
inflows was increasingly short-term. A number of measures were adopted (Ostry
et al., 2010):
o
o

Explicit tax on capital flows on stock market investments, foreign loans and
some foreign exchange transactions.
Administrative controls – outright prohibitions against or minimum maturity
requirement for certain types of inflows.

2009 – 2011: In the post Global Financial Crisis era, Brazil experienced large
capital inflows and strong appreciation pressures between 2009 and 2011.
Various capital management techniques were implemented during this period as
shown in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Brazil – Capital Management Techniques after Global Financial Crisis
Date
Type
Measure
October
2009

Capital controls

October
2010

Capital controls

January
2011

Prudential
regulations

March
2011

Capital controls

July 2011

Prudential
regulation

December
2011

Capital controls

financial

financial

2 per cent financial transactions tax on nonresident equity and fixed income portfolio
inflows by the Ministry of Finance.

Increase in financial transactions tax from 2
per cent to 4 per cent

Introduction of limitations on foreign
investors‟ ability to shift investment from
equity to fixed income investments
Noninterest reserve requirement equivalent to 60
per cent of banks‟ short dollar positions in the FX
spot market that exceeds US$3 billion or their
capital base which- ever is smaller.
Increase in financial transactions tax to 6 per cent
on new foreign loans (banking loans and
securities issued abroad) with maturity of up to
one year
Mandatory noninterest reserve requirement for
amounts over US$1 billion or their capital base,
whichever is smaller
Reduction of financial transactions tax on equity
and fixed income portfolio inflows to 0 per cent


Source: Fritz and Prates (2013)

Reviews of the Brazil experience during the 1993-97 period suggest that capital
controls were effective in reducing both the volume and composition of capital
inflows (Ostry et al., 2010). In the post global crisis period, a combination of
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prudential financial regulations and capital controls were used. In Brazil,
prudential regulation emerged as a key instrument for addressing the main cause
of external vulnerability and currency appreciation (Fritz and Prates, 2013).

IV.3

Lessons Learnt from Emerging Economies’ Experience

The idea of restricting capital mobility as a means of reducing macroeconomic
instability is not new to emerging economies. The literature contains several
reviews of the use of capital controls by emerging economies since the 1970s.
Despite hostility to capital controls by international financial institutions, emerging
economies had gone ahead and implemented capital controls to address their
vulnerability to financial crisis, especially Asian and Latin American countries
which experienced the Latin American debt and the Asian financial crises. While
in the 1990s, emphasis was on capital controls, in the post-global financial crisis
and the change in attitude by the IMF, the focus is now on the new
nomenclature – capital management techniques (measures) which combine
capital controls and prudential financial regulations. What can we learn from the
experiences of the emerging economies that have implemented capital
controls? Is there policy space for adoption of capital controls?
In addition to the few case studies described above, several other emerging
countries have also implemented capital controls; they include China, India,
South Korea, Croatia, etc. What lessons can be learned from the experiences of
emerging economies?
1.

Is there policy space for capital controls? The IMF Articles of Agreement
created the policy space for governments to implement capital controls,
although the Bretton Woods institutions for decades promoted financial
integration. Several emerging economies have implemented capital
controls despite the stigma associated with it for several decades. The
policy space has broadened since the turn-around by the IMF in 2010. The
IMF has agreed that capital controls are a legitimate part of the toolkit for
managing capital inflows in certain circumstances. That is, it is part of the
policy options available to governments to counter the potential negative
economic and financial effects of sudden surges in capital flows.
However some bilateral agreements still restrict the policy space for use of
capital controls, for example, bilateral agreements with the United States
penalise the use of capital controls.

2.

Do capital controls expand policy space for independent policy making?
With respect to capital management measures, it has been argued by
some authors that policy makers face what is referred to as the impossible
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trinity (Sumanjeet, 2009). The argument is that it is impossible for a nation‟s
economic policy to simultaneously deliver more than two of the following
three desirable macroeconomic goals: a fixed exchange rate, an
independent monetary policy, and free movement of capital. For
example, monetary authorities may want to lower domestic interest rates
to reduce cost of borrowing and increase investment and employment.
At other times, they may want to raise interest rates to reduce inflation.
Free capital mobility can undermine such policies because foreign
investors will move capital away from countries with low interest rates to
countries with higher interest rates. Thus lowering domestic interest rates
may encourage capital flight, while raising interest rates may attract
inflows of capital driving down interest rates, in both cases counteracting
the domestic policy (Epstein, 2009). Reviews of the experiences of
emerging economies showed that for many of them, capital controls
provided the space for independent monetary policy. Malaysia was able
to avoid going to the IMF for assistance and to pursue her independent
development policy to meet her development objectives.
3.

Are capital controls effective? One of the earlier arguments against
capital controls is that they are ineffective. However, studies since the
global financial crisis show that the use of capital controls helped
countries to avoid some of the worst growth outcomes of the crisis. While
capital controls did not always reduce the volume of capital inflows, they
altered the composition of inflows away from shorter-term inflows.

4.

Capital controls and prudential regulations – are they stand-alone
measures?: In a majority of the countries reviewed in the literature,
domestic financial stability concerns associated with large capital inflows
have often been addressed by introducing prudential financial
regulations in addition to capital controls, that is, by adopting capital
management techniques instead of using either of them as stand-alone
measures.

5.

Greater use of controls on capital inflows than on outflows: Many of the
capital controls have focused on capital inflows, some countries have
also targeted capital outflows. Controls on outflows can be “preventive
controls”, for example, taxes on funds remitted abroad or outright
prohibition on transfers of funds abroad. Such measures are expected to
reduce rundown of foreign reserves. In reality, these measures have often
been ineffective as the private sector has found ways to circumvent
them. It has sometimes led to outright corruption. In some cases where
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controls on capital outflows were used, there had been an increase in
capital flight after the controls were imposed. It is also suggested that if
inflows are properly managed, there may be less need to target outflows
although the IMF has supported controls on outflows in Iceland, Ukraine,
and Latvia (Gallagher, 2011). In the post global crisis era, while conditions
vary across emerging and developing economies, weaker growth and
risks of capital outflows raise new policy challenges.
6.

Country-specific design of capital management techniques: Studies show
that design of capital controls and prudential regulations should be
country-specific, there is no one-size-fits-all instrument for all countries.
Countries have adopted measures that suited their situations. Although
the URR (unremunerated reserve requirements) has been popular in many
emerging economies, the coverage and rates have varied between
countries, for example. Some countries have tightened their instruments to
block loopholes and reduce evasion. Furthermore, the country
experiences also showed that the effectiveness of capital controls and
prudential regulations in terms of reducing inflows, altering their
compositions, or achieving the desired macroeconomic objectives
depend on country‟s implementation capacity.

7.

Are capital controls a last resort policy option? The IMF had suggested
that capital controls should be implemented only after a number of other
policies have been implemented, that is, capital controls should be used
as a last resort and should be temporary. However, the experiences of
China and India during the 1990s East Asian crisis suggest that the two
countries already had capital controls in place and were therefore able
to avoid the worst consequences of the crisis. Similar studies of the recent
global financial crisis also suggest that countries with capital controls in
place before the crisis hit avoided the worst growth outcomes. This
suggests that capital controls should not be imposed as a last resort
measure but should be part of the policy options to be considered for
addressing surges in capital inflows or outflows. They may be ineffective if
introduced after the crisis has hit.

8.

Reducing evasion of capital controls: Reviews of use of capital controls
show that the private sector has always found ways to evade controls.
Ways of doing this include over-invoicing of imports, under-invoicing of
exports, mislabelling of the nature of the capital movement, resorting to
illegal methods including bribery, etc. (Edwards, 1999). Some studies show
that the effectiveness of capital controls diminishes over time as the
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private sector invests in avoidance techniques. There will be need for
effective supervision of financial institutions as well as revisions (tightening)
of regulations to block loopholes which can be exploited by the private
sector. This implies that the regulatory and supervisory frameworks in
emerging economies may need to be strengthened.

V.

Conclusion

Although the Article of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund allowed
countries to impose capital controls, the IMF and the World Bank have been
advocates of liberalisation of financial markets and until recently were hostile to
the use of capital controls by emerging economies. However, despite this hostility,
many emerging economies have utilised the policy space provided by the
Articles of Agreement to impose capital controls to address the negative impacts
of surges in capital movements in and out of their economies. Reviews of the use
of capital controls have focused on the experiences of emerging market
economies especially those in East Asia and Latin America which had
experienced financial crisis – the Latin American debt crisis and the East Asian
financial crisis respectively. The recent global financial crisis led to a rethinking on
some long-held views relating to financial liberalisation and the use of capital
controls. The IMF has now included capital controls as one of the policy options to
address surges in capital movements, thus expanding the policy space for the
use of capital controls as may be necessary. It proposed a new nomenclature for
capital controls given the stigma associated with it in the past, suggesting that
they be referred to as “capital flow management measures”. Thus the focus of
recent reviews is on the use of capital management measures – capital controls
plus prudential regulations – by emerging market economies. However, some
bilateral agreements still restrict the use of capital controls to protect their
investments.
Reviews of the emerging market experiences have shown that while capital
controls may not reduce the volume of inflows, they have helped to alter the
composition away from short-term flows towards longer-term and more stable
flows. They also provide more leeway for authorities to implement independent
monetary and other domestic policies that address other objectives of the
government.
While the IMF‟s change of attitude towards capital controls was welcomed by
emerging and developing countries, they were less receptive of the IMF
guidelines regarding when capital controls should be used. Brazil‟s Finance
Minister told an IMF Steering meeting – “We oppose any guidelines, frameworks or
codes of conduct that attempt to constrain, directly or indirectly, policy
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responses of countries facing surges in volatile capital inflows” (Gallagher, 2011).
There is need to give countries the flexibility to deploy capital controls to prevent
or mitigate crisis. This is important in the post global crisis era where growth has
slowed down. The July 2013 IMF Survey showed that financial market volatility
increased globally in May and June 2013 after a period of calm and emerging
market economies have been the hardest hit. Some of the rise in volatility may
reverse, however, if the underlying volatilities persist and financial market volatility
remains high, it could lead to increase in capital outflows and lower growth in
emerging economies. It is, therefore, important for emerging market economies
to make adequate use of the existing policy space for capital controls to protect
their economies from financial market volatilities which lead to macroeconomic
instability. They should also pay greater attention to provisions of
bilateral/multilateral agreements which restrict policy space for use of capital
controls.
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Types
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Controls

Objectives

Price Based

Inflows

 Keep a stable and
competitive
exchange rate
 Limit excessive debt
and maturity or
locational
mismatch to
prevent financial
instability.
 Alter composition of
inflows to attract
desired inflows.
 Limit foreign
ownership of assets
for sovereign
purposes or to
protect domestic
industries

 Tobin tax (tax on
foreign
exchange
transactions).
 Reserve
requirements on
inflows, for
example,
Unremunerated
Reserve
Requirements
(URR).
 Taxation of
capital inflows.

 Quantitative
limits on foreign
ownership of
domestic
companies‟
assets.
 Reporting
requirements
and quantitative
limits on
borrowing from
abroad.
 Limits on ability
to borrow from
offshore entities.

Outflow
s

 Protect tax base by
reducing capital
flight.
 Maintain stability of
exchange rate.
 Preserve savings to
finance investment.
 Help in credit
allocation
mechanism in order
to support industrial
policy and
investments for
social objectives.
 Enhance
the
autonomy
of
monetary policy in
order to reduce
inflation or expand
employment
and
economic growth.




Tobin tax
Multiple
exchange
rates

 Exchange
controls.
 Restrictions on
purchase
of
foreign assets
including
foreign
deposits.
 Limits
on
currency
convertibility.

Source: Epstein (2009)

Quantity Based

(Capital

Prudential
 Keynesian tax
(tax
on
domestic
financial
transactions).
 Reporting
requirements
and
limitations on
maturity
structure on
liabilities and
assets.
 Reserve
requirements
on deposits.
 Capital
requirements
on assets and
restrictions on
off-balance
sheet
activities and
derivatives
contracts.
 Limits on asset
acquisition.
 Asset backed
reserve
requirements.
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Appendix 2: Capital Account Management Measures
Inflows
Outflows


Unremunerated reserve requirements



agents to invest abroad or hold

as

bank accounts in foreign currency.

reserve

requirements

in

the


foreign

Limits or taxes on net liability position

transactions done with their foreign

in

accounts.

foreign

currency

of

financial



End use limitations: Borrowing abroad



agents

to

report

for

foreign exchange derivatives.

Restrictions on currency mismatches.

investments

on
and

Prohibitions or limits on sectors in
which foreigners can invest.



Limits or approval on how much

only allowed for investment and

non-residents can invest, e.g., on

foreign trade.

portfolio investments.

Limits on domestic agents that can



Restrictions on amounts of principal

borrow abroad (e.g. only firms with

or

net revenues in foreign currency).

investors can send abroad.

Mandatory approvals for all or some



capital transactions.


requirements

domestic





Mandatory

Taxes on new debt inflows, or on

intermediaries.



Mandatory approval for domestic

(a proportion of new inflows are kept
Central Bank).




Minimum stay requirements.

Source: Gallagher et al.., (2011)

capital

income

that foreign

Limits on how much non-residents
can borrow in the domestic market.



Taxes on capital outflows.
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Appendix 3: International Arrangements Restricting the Scope for Capital Controls
Several countries have assumed legal obligations to liberalise capital movements
under different international arrangements. These obligations may the country‟s
ability to use capital controls. But prudential regulations that do not discriminate
between residents and non-residents (and as such, do not constitute capital
controls) may still be available.
World Trade Organisation/General Agreement on Trade and Services (WTO/GATS):
Members only incur obligations to remove restrictions on capital flows if they have
made commitments in the financial services sector. But even then, these constraints
are limited in scope, the commitments are subject to periodic rounds of negotiation,
may be of a qualified nature, and there are prudential carve-outs. There is also a
general balance-of-payments clause that allows the use of capital controls under
specific circumstances.
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs): There are
about 2,500 BITs as well as bilateral and regional trade agreements that provide
legal protection for foreign investments. These agreements usually liberalise inward
investments and provide for free repatriation of such investment. They typically
include: “most-favoured-nation” clauses.
Most BITs and FTAs either provide
temporary safeguards on capital inflows and outflows to prevent or mitigate
financial crises, or defer that matter to the host country‟s legislation. However, BITs
and FTAs to which the United States is a party (with the exception of NAFTA) do not
permit restrictions on either capital inflows or outflows.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): The OECD‟s
Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements is the only legally binding instrument
focusing comprehensively and exclusively on international capital movements. It
covers all types of capital flows, but its framework enables members to remove
restrictions on capital movements in a progressive manner. The members are
permitted to lodge reservations with respect to specific transactions at the time of
joining the OECD (and in the case of a number of transactions considered shortterm in nature, these reservations can be reintroduced at any time). The Code also
provides a very broad level of temporary derogation for capital flows (for reasons
arising from “serious economic and financial disturbances” and for balance of
payment reasons).
European Union (EU): Members of the EU are prohibited from imposing any
restrictions on cross-border movements of capital among EU members and third
countries. There are safeguards that allow for the temporary imposition of
restrictions. But once an EU member joins the currency union, these safeguards may
only be imposed by the EU Council and are limited to nonmembers.
Source: Ostry et al., (2011)
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Appendix 4: Lists of Emerging Economies by Different Agencies
Agency/Year
IMF (July 2012)

No. of
countries
22

Emerging
Market Global
Players (EMGP)
project at
Columbia
University (April,
2013)
FTSE Group:

16

MSCI (June
2013)

19

The Economist

22

Standard and
Poor‟s List

20

Dow Jones list
(September
2011)

22

Frontier Strategy
Group (F10) –

10

22

Names of Countries
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Estonia,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Thailand,
Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Hungary, India,
Israel, South Africa, South Korea, Mexico, Poland,
Russia, Slovenia, Thailand, Taiwan, Turkey

Advanced Emerging Markets: Brazil, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, South
Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey
Secondary Emerging Economies: Chile, China,
Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Morocco,
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russia, United Arab
Emirates
Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic,
Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico,
Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South
Africa, Thailand, Turkey
Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic,
Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico,
Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South
Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Hong, Singapore, Saudi
Arabia
Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic,
Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico,
Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South
Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey (United Arab
Emirates, Qatar, and Jordan under consideration)
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru,
China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Thailand, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia,
Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, South Africa (Greece,
South Korea and Taiwan are on the watchlist)
China, Brazil, India, Mexico, Russia, Indonesia,
Colombia, Argentina, Chile, Turkey
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Emerging and
Growth Leading
Economies
(EAGLES)
NEST - Expected
Incremental
GDP
Next eleven

175

9

China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil,
Mexico, Russia, Turkey

15

Argentina, Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Egypt,
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Thailand, South Africa, Ukraine, Vietnam
Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Philippines, South Korea, Turkey, Vietnam
Bahrain, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Jordan,
Mauritius, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Romania,
Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab
Emirates, Venezuela
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Kenya, Lebanon, Malaysia,
Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Senegal, South Africa,
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Vietnam

11

Other Emerging
Markets

20

Emerging
Markets Index
(2008)

32

Appendix 5: Use of Capital Controls in Malaysia
Period
Policy Tools
1989-1995
 Ban on the sale of money market securities with a maturity of
Control on
less than one year to foreigners
Capital
 Limits on domestic banks‟ foreign borrowing intended for
Inflows
portfolio and non-trade related investment
 An unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) which required
that part of a foreign ringgit deposit would not receive interest.
 Prohibiting commercial banks from offering non-trade related
forward or swap options in order to limit currency speculation.
 Ceilings on banks‟ net liability position
 Implementation of capital controls was supplemented by
several prudential regulations
1998-2001
 Closure of offshore ringgit market
Controls on  Prohibition of all ringgit credit to foreigners that are not related
Capital
to trade or FDI
Outflows
 12 month moratorium on repatriation of foreign funds held in
Malaysia
 Mandatory repatriation of all ringgit held abroad
Sources: Cordero and Montecino (2010) and Ostry et al., (2011).

